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In order to get to know more precisely the way national fiscal rules work, in our study
3
 we tried to 
differentiate the signaling function from the limiting one in regard to the operation of the rules. The former 
occurs when a government introduces fiscal rules to show its commitment to a disciplined fiscal policy, 
while the latter refers to the fact that rules constitute a true obstacle for budgetary policy. Through an 
empirical examination on our own database, we considered only the observations when the reigning 
government responsible for fiscal policy differed from the previous government responsible for its 
establishment; in this way we measured the effect of the limiting function the rules had. The results of our 
panel econometric study prove that fiscal rules can contribute to disciplined fiscal policy after a change in 
government, in times of economic upturn. All this, however, does not mean that the signaling function 
would be useless; quite the contrary. Our results, in line with the literature, indicate that the double 
functions of the rule complement one another. The government that introduces the rule is mostly already 
committed to a disciplined policy, and wishes to signal this in the short term. With the appearance of new 
governments, however, the rule changes its function and promotes disciplined economic activity efficiently 
in the long term. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The European sovereign debt crisis beginning in 2009 became a turning point in judging the role and 
relevance of fiscal policy and more concretely the national budgetary rules (e.g., Cottarelli et al., 2014; 
Romer, 2012). This can be explained partly by the fact that the crisis—due to its nature—revealed the 
weakness of budgetary policies: the fiscal architecture that previously seemed to be so stable turned out to 
be significantly more vulnerable than expected. Budgetary policy often only seemed to be sustainable, later 
this turned out to be only a superficial and illusory observation. Although the differences between the 
individual cases are significant, and there were countries (such as Ireland and Spain) where the problem did 
not stem primarily from fiscal policy, in the end the crisis undermined public finance in these cases as well 
(Beetsma & Gradus, 2012). Besides, budgetary policy turned out in several countries to be unable to 
survive a trust crisis that appeared in the financial markets. In these cases, exaggerated indebtedness, 
procyclical economic policies, unpredictable governance, a lack of trust regarding budgetary policies, and a 
lack of transparency stood generally in the background of the problems. Although the reasons lie deeper 
(see Győrffy, 2012), after the affected European societies experienced what enormous damage is caused by 
the correction of budgetary policy when carried out by the market, there was considerable pressure on 
European leaders to come up with a solution that would prevent its repetition. In accordance with the tenets 
and principles of mainstream economic thinking, established several decades ago, attention turned to 
institutional solutions. 
As part of this process, on the one hand, interest in budgetary rules increased significantly, and on the other 
hand, it brought to an end an almost two decade-long procedure during which national budgetary rules 
conquered European countries; only a few European states had national fiscal rules at the beginning of the 
1990s, whereas in 2014 there was at least one valid provision in each European Union (EU) member state 
(European Commission, 2015). During this period, the number of valid national rules increased sixfold in 
the EU, so today there are on average three provisions in each EU member state that try to limit budgetary 
policy. The aim of this limitation and the general aim of budgetary rules is usually to handle and mitigate 
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the effect of incentives stemming from the qualities of representative democracy, which lead decision 
makers toward budgetary overspending (deficit bias).  
It is important to stress, however, that although fiscal rules are looked upon by many as a panacea, there is 
still a lot of uncertainty regarding the efficiency of the instrument. On the one hand, because the nature of 
fiscal policy is rooted in deeper social phenomena, a long-term solution is presumably not to be found in 
the regulation of budgetary policy (Brender & Drazen; 2005). Fiscal institutional solutions could still be 
able to support this process, for example, by internalizing the costs of undisciplined public policy for 
politicians (Kumar & Ter-Minassian, 2007). On the other hand, it is dangerous to consider these rules as a 
panacea, as we still do not have sufficient knowledge about their functioning and efficiency.  
One of the most important obstacles that make the measurement of the effect of budgetary rules more 
difficult is the problem of endogeneity. This means that during measurement it is hard to separate the 
different kinds and directions of relations between fiscal policy and rules. According to one approach, the 
introduction of fiscal rules serves as a signal for the different market and political stakeholders in terms of 
the government’s commitment to disciplined fiscal policy. In this case, the decision makers use fiscal rules 
as a means to influence the external evaluation of the government’s economic policy, which Debrun and 
Kumar (2007) identify as a “signal” hypothesis. According to another approach, the fiscal rule that works 
adequately is the “limiting” means, which is able to affect the behavior of decision makers via different 
incentives and thus contribute to disciplined fiscal policy. 
The empirical studies published so far handle the issue of endogeneity with instrumental variables, or do 
not handle them at all. Apart from the use of instrumental variables, we created a new variable and a related 
database, with which the problem can hopefully be handled successfully. 
Contrary to most previous studies, our research question does not refer to the general effect the rules have 
on the fiscal balance, but we were curious to know precisely how the rules affect budgetary policy in times 
of economic upturn. Another change compared to most previous studies is that we used the primary balance 
for the measurement of fiscal performance instead of the cyclically adjusted primary balance.
4
  
Apart from these changes, we tried to solve the apparent contradiction between the two approaches based 
on the results, differentiating the short- and long-term effects in the functioning of budgetary rules. 
Next, in the second part of the study, we will sum up the most important literature related to the effect and 
efficiency of fiscal rules, discussing separately the works examining the limiting and signaling role. The 
third part will present the data used for our investigation, providing detailed justification in these terms for 
the parts and ways in which we differ from practice. The fourth part contains the descriptive statistics for 
the data. The fifth part presents the details of the results received during the different evaluation procedures, 
and the last part provides our conclusions. 
2. FINDINGS FROM THE LITERATURE 
While many studies, as early as the 1980s, have dealt with the nature and functioning of supranational rules, 
the research community has dedicated much less attention to national fiscal rules introduced to Europe 
(Benczes, 2011). The first wave of case studies (Berndsen, 2001; Hemming & Kell, 2001), as well as 
comparative examinations including qualitative means (Kopits, 2001), date from the end of the 1990s, but 
the compilation and publication of the European Commission Fiscal Rules Database from the middle of the 
first decade of the new millennium provided the real breakthrough that opened up the way to large-sample, 
quantitative investigations. Needless to say, this does not mean that case studies or qualitative 
investigations were reduced in their number or significance (e.g., Benecki et al., 2009; Dupont & Kwarteng, 
2012; Hallerberg & Von Hagen, 2006; Wyplosz, 2012), but that the large-sample econometric studies 
appeared to complement them.  
Apart from providing other useful pieces of information, the mentioned database (European Commission, 
2015) contains an index, the Fiscal Rules Index (FRI), which measures the strength and institutional 
embeddedness comprising the whole set of valid national budgetary rules in individual countries in a given 
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year. Its value is determined by the joint value of the Fiscal Rule Strength Index (FRSI), which measures 
the strength of the individual rules. When calculating this latter index, the extent to which the given rule 
covers the budget is particularly emphasized, together with the legal basis of the provision, the set character 
of the objectives that were determined in the rule, the elaborate character of the alert, and corrective 
mechanisms. The value of the index increases if there is a body (typically a fiscal council) with the task of 
monitoring and enforcing the rule, or if the discourse on rule compliance appears in public. The index 
therefore does not measure what the rule says, or whether the fiscal policy complies with its provisions 
(about this see Reuter, 2015 for more detail), but the extent to which the organizational, legal, and 
institutional background related to regulation supports the functioning of the rule.
5
 
In line with theories referring to the objectives of budgetary rules, the largest group of econometric studies 
using FRI examines the extent to which the national fiscal rules are able to contribute to the improvement 
of budgetary balance. A part of the differences existing between them is of a technical nature, such as the 
number of examined countries and years, the type of chosen evaluation method, the selection of the index 
measuring fiscal performance, and the type and quantity of other factors and control variables considered 
apart from the rules.  
The fundamental question, decisive from the aspect of interpreting the results, is handling endogeneity 
(Poterba, 1996). This question is nourished from multiple sources and is the recurring problem of each 
econometric and non-econometric examination of the field. This refers to the fact that even if it can be 
demonstrated that the appearance and strengthening of budgetary rules imply the improvement of budgetary 
discipline, it does not necessarily mean that the relation between the two is one-way and that only the 
former influences the latter. Many logical explanations indicate that this causal relation could be the other 
way around; in these cases, the politicians carrying out a disciplined budgetary policy may wish to show 
their dedication for disciplined public finance—a display aimed either toward the electors or toward other 
economic or political actors and communities.  
As the solution to the problem encounters serious obstacles both statistically and economically, one part of 
previous studies concentrated on demonstrating joint movement (correlation) and did not try to solve the 
possible directions of causal relations. A classic example is the research of the European Commission 
(2006), whose authors as a first step examined the 15-year timeline of EU member states with the help of 
descriptive statistical methods and found that after the introduction of national fiscal rules, the cyclically 
adjusted balance to GDP improves 0.2 percent on average in the first year, and 0.4 percent on average until 
the third year. This was also confirmed by regression estimates carried out on the panel database, with the 
result that a unit (one standard deviation) increase in the FRI improves the cyclically adjusted primary 
balance by 0.21 percent of the GDP. This corresponds roughly to the results of Marneffe et al. (2010) and is 
in line with statements made by Bergman et al. (2013). Nerlich and Reuter (2013) found similar results with 
a different method, measuring the presence of fiscal rules with a binary variable (a dummy) instead of FRI, 
and found that this introduction improved the ratio of cyclically adjusted primary balance to GDP by 0.55 
percent.  
The first researchers to deal more in depth with the direction of the causal relation were Debrun et al. 
(2008), who tried to handle the endogeneity issue with instrumental variables, among them the delayed 
value of the FRI. The result of the exam carried out in this way was that one standard deviation increase of 
the FRI improves the cyclically adjusted primary balance by 0.4 percent of the GDP, and has a bigger effect 
in the long term. Ayuso-i-Casals et al. (2009), Afonso and Hauptmeier (2009), and Dahan and 
Strawczynski (2010) reached a similar result with a similar method.
6
 Heinemann and Yeter (2014), 
however, treated the endogeneity issue in a new way. According to their starting assumption, as soon as 
politicians decide to introduce a new rule or change the current one, they take into consideration its 
(political) costs and thus give up a part of (their) discretionality. The decision makers, however, do not 
account for cases with the appearance of sudden shocks, although the political costs of giving up 
discretionality in these cases are highest. For this reason, the authors investigated whether fiscal rules affect 
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fiscal policy amidst negative increase shocks as well, and after they found a positive and significant effect, 
they considered it as proved that rules indeed are able to contribute to the improvement of the budgetary 
balance.  
Sacchi and Salotti (2015) also examined the issue from a somewhat similar approach. They quote Musgrave 
(1959) when stating that the task of the state is not to run a strict budgetary policy all the time, but to adapt 
the public finances to ensure macroeconomic stability. The novelty of their method was that they examined 
not the fiscal indices, but their effect on GDP volatility. One of the advantages of this method is that it can 
directly measure the extent to which the rules help execute the state functions successfully, and on the other 
hand thereby also avoid the issue of endogeneity. The calculations carried out on the 21 OECD member 
states between 1985 and 2012 proved that the rules are able to contribute to macroeconomic stability.  
Another group of empirical researchers examined the correlation previously identified by Debrun and 
Kumar (2007) as a “signal” hypothesis, the essence of which is that if a government manages to 
communicate authentically toward financial market stakeholders that it is able to run a disciplined 
budgetary policy, this will reduce public expenditure via financing costs and thereby improve budget 
balance.  
The vast majority of empirical results indicate that budget rules are indeed able to strengthen trust 
concerning the economic policy of a given country and increase credibility. Bayoumi et al. (1995) were 
among the first researchers to prove, based on US data, that a state with an average level of indebtedness 
pays 50 base points less interest if it has a constitutional rule limiting government loans. Their results were 
generally confirmed by several others (e.g., Christoffel et al., 2010; Szczypińska, 2014; Thornton & 
Vasilakis, 2017), while Iara and Wolff (2010) called attention to the fact that the existence of fiscal rules 
can mitigate government bond yields, especially in times of crisis.
7
 
3. DATABASE AND NEW APPROACHES  
As we demonstrated above, the number of studies dealing with budget rules increased substantially in the 
past 10 years, but there are still many question marks and grey areas.  
The issue of endogeneity and the method of handling it affect the very essence of the study results and the 
conclusions that can be drawn from them (Heinemann et al., 2016). The answers provided to these issues 
and presented above are by all means progressive, but we believe that more studies and new methods need 
to be elaborated in order to provide a reassuring answer to the question related to the efficiency and 
functioning of national budget rules. Apart from this, it is also important to call attention to the fact that the 
vast majority of studies examined fiscal discipline within the balance by ignoring the evolution of economic 
cycles—which substantially affects the direction of fiscal effects expected from economic policy. With our 
own research, we tried to contribute to progress primarily in these two fields.  
Before going into the details, however, we need to stress that our definition of budgetary rules is limited in 
several directions. On the one hand, our examination comprehends only the numeric provisions containing 
procedural rules used during the practical compilation and enforcement of the general budget. On the other 
hand, we concentrate exclusively on the rules appearing directly in the national legal systems, and thus 
ignore supranational provisions. Third, budget rules are now widely used worldwide, so our study 
concentrates more on European practice, more precisely with the EU member states.  
Our study evaluates the period of almost one and a half decades preceding the crisis (1995–2008). Ensuring 
the comparability of the data played a decisive role in choosing the starting date of the period, while the 
endpoint was determined by the crisis outbreak. We considered this latter to be justified because the global 
financial, economic, and European debt crisis stemming from it caused changes in the economic processes 
and institutional systems, which themselves justified the separation of the examined periods. On the other 
hand, most national rules were suspended in the affected countries during the crisis (Benczes, 2011). Third, 
one of the most important aspects of our research is aimed precisely at the way budget rules work in crisis-
free periods. The database compiled with this method contains 14 years of annual data from the 27 states 
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that joined the European Union prior to the crisis. A part of the data is from the database of the European 
Commission (AMECO), and the source of the budget rules and rule systems is likewise the European 
Commission database we presented previously.  
One of the changes compared to previous studies is that the fiscal orientation of the government is 
measured with the ratio of primary balance to GDP
8
 instead of the cyclically adjusted primary balance more 
frequently used in the literature, because in our view the former is a more adequate index for this purpose 
precisely due to the definition of countercyclical policy. According to the widespread view of experts, the 
condition of the countercyclical policy is the stability of the tax-to-GDP ratio and discretionary 
expenditures (see Alesina et al., 2008). In times of economic upturn, the non-discretionary items reduce the 
size of total expenditures in the percentage of GDP on the expenditure side, while progressive taxes 
improve the balance on the income side. These are the automatic stabilizers (Deroose et al., 2008) that can 
mitigate the volatility of the economic cycle by themselves, without state intervention (Tóth, 2010). 
Because, due to their character, the cyclically adjusted indices filter out precisely these effects, it is worth 
using the primary balance index to measure countercyclical policy. 
The rationale of our choice can also be well perceived in the following practical example. In order to halt a 
car rolling down a slope, the engine brake (automatic stabilizers) and the braking activity of the driver 
(discretionary measures) can also play a part. The driver’s intention is to stop the car and to brake in a way 
that takes the effect of engine braking into consideration as well. The driver can therefore only affect his 
own braking, and when examining whether he achieved his aim, we do not measure how much he braked 
but whether the car came to a stop as a consequence of the joint effect of the two different braking 
mechanisms. Apart from what was mentioned above, the use of the primary balance as a target variable is 
more practical also because unlike the cyclically adjusted index, this is independent from the potential 
output that can be estimated only with significant uncertainty (Darvas & Kostyleva, 2011; Mellár, 2016), 
and thereby posterior revisions do not significantly alter sets of data (Checherita-Westphal & Ždarek, 
2015). To confirm the robustness of our results, however, and to make our estimates comparable with 
previous research, we also carried out calculations for the cyclically adjusted balance.    
As discussed above in regard to the issue of endogeneity, even if a correlation can be proven between the 
strength of the fiscal rules and budgetary discipline, this does not necessarily mean that the former affects 
the latter. It may be that a third (hidden) variable affects both indicators, such as the electors’ preference 
(Krogstrup & Wälti, 2008), or the causal relation might be the other way around, and the government 
introduces the budget rules precisely to signal its commitment to disciplined fiscal policy toward the 
electors or other political or economic entities (e.g., Benczes, 2011; Debrun & Kumar, 2007). Some of the 
studies published so far did not manage endogeneity and examined the joint movement of the indices 
instead, and stressed that this does not affect the results (Bova et al., 2014). The fixed effect used for every 
country provides a solution to the problem of the hidden variable, as the electoral preference is presumably 
quite stable in such a short period of time within a state (Holm-Hadulla et al., 2012). 
Several studies have used (an) instrumental variable(s) to handle reverse causality, especially the delayed 
value of the explanatory variable. During our examination, we also relied on instrumental variables, but 
apart from that we elaborated a new method to solve the problem. Our aim was to separate the political will 
originating in fiscal policy from the political will that is responsible for the introduction of the fiscal rule. 
We did this by separating (and later filtering) the cases when a government leads a country in a way that its 
own budget rules are in force, and the observations when the reigning government needs to consider the 
provisions and limitations of a set of rules created by a previous government. 
For this reason, we created a new variable (GOV), which—in the framework of the previous 
categorization—can consider three values of the observations present in the database: 
 
 The government operates without a fiscal rule in the examined period (year). (These cases were 
designated by 0.) 
 The government operates with its own rule in the examined period (year). A rule is considered to be 
a government’s own if it was created or passed during the administration of the reigning head of 
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government (in presidential system it is the president) or by that of his/her party member. (These cases were 
designated by 1.) 
 The government had an inherited rule in place in the examined period. Any observation that was 
omitted from the previous two categories belongs here. This means that the countries and years are part of 
the group with a valid budget rule, but its creation and establishment cannot be related to the reigning head 
of government or his/her party. (These cases were designated by 2.) 
 
The separation seems to be effective because in the latter case we can affirm that the political will that 
brought about the rule (of a previous government) is separated from the political will (of the reigning 
government) responsible for the fiscal policy, and thus the previously mentioned endogeneity problem can 
be managed. Although the division is hopefully logical and effective, for the sake of consistent separation 
during classification some further conditions had to be defined in more detail. They are described below. 
The hardest part of the categorization was ascertaining which government was in power when accepting the 
given budget rule. For this, one needs to know when exactly this rule was accepted. Our starting assumption 
was that the rules were accepted the year before they came into force. If it was critical for categorization, or 
if it was not obvious, for instance because several governments were in power in the year preceding the rule 
coming into force, we carried out further investigation to confirm or deny and correct our starting 
supposition. As part of this, we contacted the local institutions (e.g., fiscal councils) as well as researchers 
and specialists in several countries.
9
  
In the examined period, several times several fiscal rules were born under different government regimes 
that were in force within a year. In these cases, we considered the rule to be prevalent if it covered the 
larger part of the public finances. For example, an expenditure rule was passed in Denmark under the 1993–
2001 prime ministry of Social Democrat head of state Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, which regulated the growth 
rate of public expenditures in terms of consumption. In itself this would justify classifying the observations 
into the category of own rules from their coming into force until 2001. But as the rule only covered 45 
percent of public finances, while the previous budget balance rule taken by the Conservative government–
remaining valid during the Rasmussen regime as well—covered 100 percent, the years of the Social 
Democratic government increase the number of states working with the inherited rule. If the size of the 
state finances covered by the two rules did not differ in a proportion larger than 5 percent, then we 
considered the rule with a higher FRSI value.  
In years of government change, the decision depended on which government behavior the fiscal policy of 
the given year reflected more, and on when the new government entered office during the year. If it was in 
the first semester, then the budget of the given year was the new government’s responsibility, and it 
measured its performance. If it was in the second semester, then it was of the abdicating government.  
Although in our opinion the problem of endogeneity can be handled with the introduction of the new 
variable, we must note that we needed to use one more assumption in order to ensure the coherence of the 
theoretical framework. The problem is caused by the fact that if a government can decide without particular 
consequences and external obligations about keeping a rule alive or abolishing it, then (again) we could not 
tell the difference between the political will that keeps the rule alive and the one responsible for budgetary 
policy. In practice, however, the apparent inability to differentiate these aspects is mistaken; and this can be 
explained with several factors.  
On the one hand, a portion of the provisions and obligations related to fiscal rules belongs to the highest 
source of law, the constitution, i.e., basic law. In these cases, the new government often does not have a 
parliamentary majority to change or abolish the rule.  
On the other hand, the abolition of a budgetary rule can also imply costs (Debrun & Kumar, 2007), as it 
reduces the credibility of the government considerably and makes investors uncertain about whether the 
state is committed to disciplined fiscal policy. This can have an effect via several channels, because such a 
measure can increase the financing costs coming from external sources for both the public and private 
sectors, and it can restrain the national activity of foreign investors; additionally, the reduction in 
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predictability generally deteriorates the business environment and competitiveness in the country. Precisely 
for this reason, such a decision implies considerable costs, which often probably exceed the benefits the 
government expects from the abolition of the rule.  
Our assumption is also confirmed by data: during the total period when a fiscal rule was in force in a given 
state, there were 95 operational rules and 47 government changes, yet in only five countries did a 
government abolish a budgetary rule in the year of taking office, and we know of no cases when a new 
government altered a valid rule in a way that changed its strength. Furthermore, the rules abolished after 
government change were typically not the rules that covered most public finances in the given period, and 
did not influence whether the given observation belonged to the group of own or inherited rules. For these 
reasons, we believe the group of inherited rules represents a case in which the creation of the rule is 
separate from the will of the reigning government. 
The next change does not affect primarily the database, but rather the way the question is raised. In most 
studies published so far, the authors looked for the relationship between fiscal rules and budgetary balance 
independently of the economic cycle. In these cases, one can identify the starting assumption that fiscal 
rules are successful if they improve fiscal management; in other words, the more a fiscal rule is able to 
improve the budget balance of a given state, the better and more successful it is. In our opinion, however, 
fiscal strictness is not always and not independently in all circumstances the objective of fiscal policy, or 
more precisely of fiscal rules. As Wyplosz (2012) pointed out, if there were no deficit bias, budgets would 
sometimes produce loss and sometimes profit. Instead, ensuring macroeconomic stability is what appears 
among the functions of state fiscal policy (Musgrave, 1959) and among the aims of fiscal rules (Kennedy & 
Robbins, 2001). This implies that fiscal rules are not intended to strengthen the defense against loss-making 
management in general, but to reduce and restrain deficit bias. 
Fiscal policy is adequate from the aspect of fiscal orientation if it is able to boost the economy in times of 
crisis (e.g., periods of insufficient demand) and is strict and disciplined when the economy prospers. On the 
one hand, if a government does not reduce its debt rate during economic upturn, a so-called ratchet effect 
might occur (P. Kiss, 2012). This means that if the debt rate increases during a crisis and does not merely 
increase further in crisis-free periods, then indebtedness will increase continuously in the long run due to 
the level shift related to crises, which endangers sustainability (Balatoni, 2015). Strict fiscal policy, 
however, is also needed in the short term to create fiscal space, because the acquired investor’s trust is the 
indispensable condition for satisfying the financing needs that increase in times of crisis. 
One of the aims of budgetary rules is not to force the countries to follow strict budgets independently of 
economic cycles, but to do this when the economy is prospering. To be sure, the size of the fiscal expansion 
must also be limited during the crisis, but so far there is no consensus about the threshold, which makes it 
difficult to evaluate the efficiency of the fiscal rules from that perspective.
10
 The rules are forced into the 
background during crisis because especially in the case of developing countries it is not the institutional 
environment, but the uncertainty of financial markets and the lack of credit supply that hinders expansive 
fiscal policy (Bova et al., 2014).  
For these reasons, we do not examine the relation between budgetary rules and balance in general terms, but 
only in times of boom, when disciplined fiscal policy can truly be expected. For this, we need to define 
upturn precisely0; in the end we listed the periods when the gap between actual and potential output was 
more than 0.5 percent of the potential output. We did not choose zero as a threshold limit because the 
estimates regarding real-time output gap are extremely uncertain, and governments need to be sure to run a 
strict fiscal policy during upturns.
11
 
4. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
The FRI value measuring the strength of fiscal rule systems was between -1.01 and +2.13 in the examined 
period. The first value indicates that the country had no budgetary rule in place at a national level. There 
were three of the 27 member states (Cyprus, Greece, and Malta) where there was no valid fiscal rule 
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between 1995 and 2008; in these countries, the value stayed unchanged at -1.01. In the case of the other 
member states, nevertheless, budget rules strengthened substantially (Figure 4.1).  
 
Figure 4.1. FRI value in the examined countries in 1995 and 2008 (European Commission, 2015) 
The Netherlands, Estonia, Denmark, Belgium, and Germany were ahead in budget rules at the beginning of 
the period, while in 2008 the five strongest rule systems were in place in Sweden, Great Britain, 
Luxembourg, Denmark, and Spain. Between the beginning and the end of this period, the strength of the 
rule system decreased only in Belgium, it stayed unchanged in three countries (Germany, Latvia, and the 
Netherlands), and the FRI value increased in all the other countries, which therefore grew by one on the 
average in the entire database. The biggest growth in these 14 years was achieved in this field by Sweden, 
Great Britain, Bulgaria, Luxembourg, and Poland. Altogether, while the average FRI was -0.54 in 1995 in 
the entire database, by 2008 the index grew to 0.45 and the average for the whole period was 0.03. 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Changes of FRI and primary balance  
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Considering the average primary balance as a percentage of GDP and treated as a dependent variable 
throughout our examination, the image is more varied (Figure 4.2). The index increased continuously in the 
first half of the period until the turn of the millennium, which can partly be explained by the fact that the 
introduction of the euro affected the governments of the countries as a strong incentive, since no country 
wanted to be omitted from the creation of the eurozone due to bad fiscal performance. After this, however, 
the average primary balance deteriorated considerably, which can be explained partly with the 2002–2003 
economic crisis also affecting Western Europe, and with the fact that after the introduction of the common 
currency the obligation that would have induced most of the old member states to carry out disciplined 
fiscal policy vanished.  
In the entire database, for 290 of 378 observations some sort of national fiscal rule was in place, and for 88 
cases this was not the case. In the cases where fiscal rules were in place, the average primary balance was 
1.0 percent of GDP, which further strengthens our assumption that there is some sort of link between 
balance and the rules.  
The new variable (GOV) that we created has a key role in handling endogeneity, and we used it to separate 
the observations functioning without any rule from the ones functioning with an own rule and the ones with 
inherited rules. As a result of the division, 133 cases of all the observations fell into the category of own 
rules, 157 were inherited rules, and there were 88 cases that had no valid rule (Attachment 1). 
The FRI value was 0.40 on average in the case of states that had a rule; within this category, in the case of 
own rules it was 0.58, for inherited rules it was slightly weaker, at 0.25, and in the case of the observations 
without rules it was of course -1,01, as this is the minimum value of the index.  
There is a larger difference in terms of budgetary balances: while the average primary balance was 0.1 
percent of GDP in the case of the observations without rules, if there was any fiscal rule in place, the index 
value rose to 1.0. Within this category, the average primary balance was 1.5 percent of GDP in the case of 
own rules and 0.6 percent of GDP in the case of inherited rules. This is particularly important to us because 
it shows that budget balance improves considerably after introduction, and although discipline decreases 
somewhat after government changes, the balance is still more favorable than in the case of countries 
working without a rule. 
 
Figure 4.3: Changes of FRI and primary balance in different groups  
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We repeated the comparison by focusing only on the upturn period and filtered out the cases when the gap 
between the actual and potential gap was higher than 0.5 percent of the potential output. There are 
substantial differences in terms of primary-balance-to-GDP ratio between the fiscal performances 
governing without a rule (0.96), with inherited rules (1.32), and with own rules (1.54). 
5. RESULTS 
Before discussing the results of the estimate procedures, it is important to stress that our calculations 
contain a series of assumptions for which we have no precise knowledge. One of these is that we examined 
the existence of linear relations in the estimate procedures, while we assumed that the marginal effect of 
fiscal rules is not independent of the regulation level. Likewise, we could not take into consideration what 
several other investigations have called attention to (for example, Heinemann et al. [2014]), namely that the 
effect of the rules can depend on other factors, such as political culture, structure of the broader institutional 
circumstances, or the relevant attitude of citizens.  
As a first step, before examining the database as a panel database, we took the average of the FRI value 
referring to the whole period in each country and compared the index we received to the average primary 
balance. Of course, this simplification covers many things, and the number of datapoints is too limited to 
draw relevant conclusions, but it still provides a comprehensive picture of the relation between the two 
variables in the long term.  
 
Figure 5.1: Relation between FRI and primary balance with crosscut data  
*** denotes significance at 1% level 
 
The vertical axis of Figure 5.1 is the primary-balance-to-GDP ratio, the horizontal axis FRI, and the 
relationship between the two appears to be quite strong: if FRI increases by 1 point, the primary-balance-to-
GDP ratio improves 1.2 percent. To estimate more precisely, and to be able to explain more efficiently, we 
complemented the model with the 1995–2008 average of the following variables, in accordance with the 
literature: 
1. GAP: output gap,12 measuring the difference between the actual and potential GDP as a percentage of 
potential GDP. 
2. WGI: index measuring the efficiency of government work, from the WGI indices elaborated by the 
World Bank (Worldwide Governance Indicators). 
                                                     
12  Estimated with a Hodrick-Prescott filter. (Source: AMECO). 
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3. GDP: gross domestic product per capita calculated on purchasing power parity. 
4. d: gross consolidated public debt as a percentage of GDP (debt rate). 
 
With the integration of the new variables we estimated the following equation
13
 on the cross-section data, 
where i stands for the different countries:  
 
 𝑝𝑏𝑖 = 𝛽1𝑑𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑊𝐺𝐼𝑖 +  𝛽3𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐹𝑅𝐼𝑖 + 𝑐    (1) 
 
As a result of the inclusion of the new variables, the explanatory power of the estimation grew from 13 
percent to 53 percent on the adjusted R square (Table 5.1). 
 
Table 5.1: Results of the cross-section estimate 
 
At the same time, the FRI coefficient grew to 1.76, which indicates that while we control the level of the 
debt rate, the GDP, the output gap, and the government efficiency, if the average value of the FRI grows by 
1, the average value of the primary-balance-to-GDP ratio improves by 1.76 percent.  
However, the estimation carried out on the cross-section data is small, consisting of only 27 data points and 
considering only the differences between countries. In other words, it cannot capture the effect of a fiscal 
rule being introduced or the strength of an already existing rule being changed within a country from one 
year to another. For this reason, we “unfolded” the dataset for further examination, and examined the 14 
years and the 27 EU members; that is, we treated the database containing 378 observations as a panel. 
To start with, similar to the previous examination, with the help of the new panel database we represented 
the relation between the balance indicator and FRI (Figure 5.2). This also indicates that there is a 
relationship between budgetary policy and the rule system: the regression line rising from left to right 
indicates that the stronger a rule is, the more advantageous the primary balance becomes. The coefficient of 
the regression line is significant, which numerically means that if the FRI value increases by 1, the primary-
balance-to-GDP ratio improves by 0.87 percent, with a relatively low 7 percent R
2
.   
 
                                                     
13 The invariant is indicated with “c.” 
Explanatory variables
0.05 ***
(0,00)
-3,42
(0,74)
1,50 ***
(0,01)
0,12 ***
(0,01)
1,76 ***
(0,01)
N 27
R2 0,63
ADJ R2 0,53
*** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. p probability values are in 
brackets. The OLS estimate was carried out with clustered standard errors.
Dependent variable: pb
Debt rate (d)
Government efficiency (WGI)
Output gap (GAP)
Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
Fiscal Rules Index (FRI)
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Figure 5.2: Relation between FRI and primary balance 
*** denotes significance at 1% level 
For more precise estimates, we transformed the regression into a fiscal reaction equation, and apart from the 
above complemented it with further two variables, which could play an important role in the case of a given 
country in forming the primary balance. These are: 
 ELCT: This variable controls the effect that political cycles have on the budgetary balance. It 
measures the years until the next parliamentary elections compared to the current year.  
 EURO: This variable tries to capture the relation according to which the countries that introduced 
the euro as a cash currency in 2001 were expected to exert disciplined fiscal policy. This is therefore a 
binary variable: a value of 1 for the 12 affected countries from the start of the examined period until 2000, 
and 0 for upcoming periods and for the other countries. 
Apart from this, we omitted six countries in which the FRI value did not change during the examined 
period. As the model structured on the panel database was able to handle changes in time, as part of the 
changes, instead of the debt rate for the examined period (d) we included in the equation its value delayed 
by 1, which can be described in the following way: 
 
𝑝𝑏𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐹𝑅𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑊𝐺𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐸𝑈𝑅𝑂𝑖,𝑡+ 𝛽6𝐸𝐿𝐶𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑐 (2) 
 
Here i indicates the individual countries and t the individual years. It is important to stress that there is a 
significant difference between the fiscal reaction function we revealed and the classical equation of a fiscal 
reaction function. This latter can be linked to Bohn (1998), and its essence is that the primary balance can 
be found on the left side of the equation, while on the right appear the delayed value of state debt next to 
other control variables. The delayed value of the primary balance generally has an important role among 
control variables, as autocorrelation is naturally high in the way this indicator changes, so its representation 
on the right side truly increases the explanatory force of the estimation. 
In our case, however, employing the classical equation would lead to misleading results if the delayed value 
of the primary balance were included among the explanatory variables. As Balázsi et al. (2014) pointed out 
in their article summing up the development of panel econometrics, in the case of an OLS estimate carried 
out on a panel database, the estimative equation provides inconsistent results if the delayed value of the 
dependent variable is included in the equation (first mentioned by Nickell, 1981). Although there are 
examples of studies in which the range of explanatory variables included the delayed value as well 
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(European Commission, 2009), we omitted this variable for the sake of more precise calculation, and we 
will deal with the problem further on in a different way. 
 
Table 5.2: Results of the panel estimate 
 
The results indicate that the relation between fiscal rules and the primary balance is significant. If the FRI 
value increases by 1, the primary-balance-to-GDP ratio improves by 0.87 percent. We found a significant 
causal effect between the delayed value of the debt rate (d), the index measuring government efficiency 
(WGI), and the index of the time until the next parliamentary elections (ELCT).  
Our results are in line with the results of studies carried out with a similar methodology. Marneffe et al. 
(2010), for instance, also found that the FRI effect on the primary balance is significant. Although the value 
of the coefficient they provided (0.32) was somewhat lower, this can partly be explained by the fact that 
they examined the member states of the eurozone during a shorter time period (1998–2008) and included 
the delayed value of the dependent variable among the explanatory variables, and the range of further 
control variables was more reduced than in the model we used. 
These last two differences are true even if we compare our results to the study of the European Commission 
(2009), which, although it examined the 27 EU members during a longer time period (1990–2007), also 
found significant relations and a coefficient (0.48) similar to ours. And although that researcher did not 
focus the study on the primary balance but on the effect of the cyclically adjusted primary balance, 
considering that our model contains the output gap (GAP) among the explanatory variables precisely to 
control the effect of the cycle, the results of the two models can be compared. Debrun et al. (2008) and 
Ayuso-i-Casals et al. (2009) also reached a similar result when examining different models.  
The examinations carried out so far serve multiple purposes. First, we presented the database, pointed out 
the most important processes and relations, and determined the starting point defined by results from the 
literature, compared to which we tried to complement and modify the studies examining the relation 
between fiscal rules and budgetary discipline with new conditions and new means. We started the 
presentation of our results by creating a new model with the help of the estimate procedure used so far, in 
which on the one hand we considered the cyclical position, and on the other hand we integrated our 
proposal referring to the handling of the endogeneity issue.  
Thus, as a first step we filtered out the observations from the database when there was an own rule in force, 
that is when GOV=1. After that we created a binary variable, GAP3, which assumed the value of 1 if the 
output gap in the percentage of potential GDP was higher than +0.5, and 0 otherwise. Next, we examined 
Explanatory variables
0,87 **
(0,02)
0,05 ***
(0,00)
0,12
(0,26)
-0,01
(0,85)
3,20 **
(0,05)
-0,40
(0,58)
0,19 ***
(0,01)
N 267
R2 0,35
Introduction of euro (EURO)
Electoral cycle (ELCT)
*** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. p probability values are in 
brackets. The OLS estimate was carried out with clustered standard errors.
Dependent variable: pb
Fiscal Rules Index (FRI)
Debt rate (d-[1])
Output gap (GAP)
Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
Government efficiency (WGI)
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the interaction of the explanatory variable (FRI) and GAP3, which due to its character shows to what 
degree FRI contributes to primary balance in times of upturn (when the output gap is larger than 0.5). This 
solution is better than simply filtering out the cases from the database in which the output gap is smaller 
than 0.5, because the size of the database and the number of observations that can be used for the estimate 
do not decrease like this. The threshold value is again 0.5 and not 0 because the estimate of the indicator, 
especially its forecast, is highly uncertain, while a government needs to be sure that the crisis is over when 
deciding about demand-reducing fiscal policy. It is important, however, to stress that the results do not 
change even if the threshold value is 0, which shows the robust character of our findings. These 
calculations are included in Attachment 2. Second, we elaborated a basic model (I.) along the changes 
above, in which among the explanatory variables we included only two variables (FRI, GAP3) and their 
interaction, as well as a detailed model (II.), containing all the other explanatory variables according to the 
following: 
 
𝑝𝑏𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐹𝑅𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑅𝐼𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐺𝐴𝑃3𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽3𝐺𝐴𝑃3𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑊𝐺𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐸𝐿𝐶𝑇𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽7𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽8𝐸𝑈𝑅𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑐           (3) 
 
What we found in the case of the basic model is that the effect of both the FRI and GAP3 is significant, and 
what is even more important to us is the interaction (multiplication) of the two variables. All of this means 
that the primary-balance-to-GDP ratio improves more than an additional 1 percent in times of upturn if the 
FRI value increases by 1.
14
 The detailed model led to a similar result from an interaction point of view. 
While the explanatory value of the model increased with the inclusion of new explanatory variables, the 
sum of the two coefficients increased as well. Based on the estimation, a 1-unit increase of the FRI 
improves the primary-balance-to-GDP ratio by 1.27 (0.46+0.81).
15
 Apart from this, WGI measuring 
government efficiency also proved to be significant, together with the number of years until the next 
parliamentary elections (ELCT), the level of gross domestic product per capita (GDP), and the lagged value 
of the debt rate (d).  
Table 5.3: Results of the reduced/adjusted panel estimates  
 
 
                                                     
14 The sum of FRI and the coefficients of the interaction did not prove to be significant in this case, so their sum cannot be interpreted. 
15 The sum of the two coefficients also proved to be significant (p=0,006) 
-0,88 * 0,46
(0,08) (0,389)
1,08 ** 0,81 **
(0,04) (0,033)
0,87 ** 0,17
(0,04) (0,702)
2,7 *
(0,06)
0,06 ***
(0,00)
0,18 *
(0,09)
0,56 **
(0,02)
0,74
(0,40)
N 167 151
R2 0,04 0,34
Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
Introduction of euro (EURO)
*** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. p probability values are in 
brackets. The OLS estimate was carried out with clustered standard errors.
Fiscal Rules Index (FRI)
Explanatory variables
Basic model (I.) Detailed model (II.)
Dependent variable: pb Dependent variable: pb
FRI*GAP3
Output gap (GAP3)
Government efficiency (WGI)
Debt rate (d-[1])
Electoral cycle (ELCT)
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As the scope of our examination was primarily the interaction between explanatory variables, the Wald-test 
also needed to be carried out. As the p-value of the test was 0.06 with the basic model (I.) and 0.001 in the 
case of the detailed model (II.), in the latter case we can certainly reject the assumption that both 
coefficients are equal to zero. 
As pointed out above, in the case of the regression estimates so far there were methodological obstacles that 
made the precise revelation of the correlations more difficult. In the case of our panel database, the OLS 
estimate did not permit using the dynamic model, that is, including the delayed variable of the primary 
balance among the explanatory variables. As results from the literature, similar to our estimates, also 
indicate that the explanatory value of the model thereby decreases significantly, we therefore looked for 
another solution. 
In order to handle the problem, we used a special version of the general moments method (GMM) created 
by Arellano and Bond (1991). This dynamic model estimates the changes of the dependent variable based 
on the changes of the explanatory variable with the help of instrumental variables. The estimated equation 
is: 
 
𝑝𝑏𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑝𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1+ 𝛽2𝐹𝑅𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐺𝐴𝑃3𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑅𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐺𝐴𝑃3𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑊𝐺𝐼𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽6𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽7𝐸𝐿𝐶𝑇𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽8𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐸𝑈𝑅𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑐          
  (4) 
 
The most important result of the model estimate, in our opinion, is that the interaction variable affects fiscal 
discipline significantly (Table 5.4). This means that the budgetary rules have no provable effect on balance 
in times of crisis, but in times of upturn, if the FRI value increases by 1, the primary-balance-to-GDP ratio 
will improve by 1.03 percent.
16
 Apart from this, the causal relation can be considered as proven in the case 
of the lagged value of the primary balance and WGI measuring government efficiency. In our case, a 0.00 
value for the Wald test also confirms the obtained result.
17
 
Table 5.4: Results of the Arellano-Bond estimate 
 
                                                     
16 The sum of the FRI and the interaction coefficient was not significant.  
17  Because of the multicollinearity, we ran the regression omitting FRI and GAP3 from the right side of the equation, and in that case their 
interaction (FRI*GAP3) still was significant, and the coefficient was 0.96. 
Explanatory variables
0,25 ***
(0,00)
-1,03
(0,15)
0,96 ***
(0,01)
-0,36
(0,17)
-0,98
(0,35)
0,03
(0,26)
0,14
(0,13)
0,02
(0,95)
1,26
(0,28)
N 123
Dependent variable: capb
Cyclically adjusted primary balance (capb[-1])
Fiscal Rules Index (FRI)
FRI*GAP3
Output gap (GAP3)
Government efficiency (WGI)
Debt rate (d-[1])
Electoral cycle (ELCT)
Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
Introduction of euro (EURO)
*** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. p probability values are in brackets. 
The Arellano-Bond estimate was carried out with clustered standard errors by country and time fixed effect.
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Altogether, therefore, if we treat the endogeneity issue by filtering out the countries with own regulations, 
and if we focus on how fiscal rules behave in times of boom, the result is that national fiscal rules are able 
to contribute considerably to disciplined fiscal policy and to improve fiscal balance. To our knowledge, no 
researchers have tried to handle endogeneity in this way previously, and because we did not find any other 
study in which the rules were examined separately, with this method only in times of boom, we cannot 
compare our results directly with others.  
Partly for this reason, we also carried out our estimate by changing the dependent variable to the cyclically 
adjusted balance-to-GDP ratio that is more frequently used in the literature and found that the growth of the 
FRI index measuring the strength of the fiscal rules system improves this indicator significantly in times of 
upturn
18
. This is in line with the results of Bergman et al. (2014), who also used the relation between FRI 
and different fiscal indices with the help of the Arellano-Bond model on a database containing 21 years of 
data for the EU member states. According to the estimate of Bergman et al., if FRI increases by 1, the 
cyclically adjusted budgetary balance in the percentage of GDP improves by 0.47 percent.  
Heinemann and Yeter (2014) and Sacchi and Salotti (2015) reached a result similar to ours with a 
completely different method; they also found that fiscal rules are able to strengthen fiscal discipline. Apart 
from the above, our results are also confirmed by previous work of Bergman et al. (2013), who—though 
they did not handle endogeneity—examined the years of the economic crisis (2009–2012) separately from 
the whole time series making up their database (1990–2012) using the Arellano-Bond method. They found 
that increasing FRI by 1 in the whole database improved the cyclically adjusted balance-to-GDP ratio by 
0.54 percent, while in the case of the model reduced to the crisis years the FRI value was negative and not 
significant. These two pieces of information indicate that fiscal rules can certainly have a substantial effect 
on fiscal discipline in crisis-free years. And although this division into crisis and crisis-free years does not 
correspond exactly to the categorization we use and that is adapted to the size of the output gap, and 
although the endogenous variable is also not exactly identical, we believe that the results of Bergman et al. 
indirectly confirm our findings.  
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The main role of our examination was to try to differentiate the signaling and limiting functions of fiscal 
rules. By handling the endogeneity issue with a new method, we demonstrated that national fiscal rules are 
able to contribute to disciplined fiscal policy. This of course does not mean that rules would not also have a 
signaling function; quite on the contrary. One of our most important partial results is that the government 
that introduces the rule usually runs a stricter fiscal policy than its successor. This is in line with empirical 
results and theoretical trends according to which governments often introduce national fiscal rules after a 
fiscal correction and amidst a stable and disciplined fiscal policy to signal to the market their commitment 
to a sustainable economy.  
Our two statements, according to which rules affect fiscal policy and that they are introduced primarily so 
that politicians can show their commitment, are only in seeming contradiction. The results of our 
investigation, in line with findings from the literature, indicate precisely that although the signaling function 
was stronger when introducing a rule—and we cannot measure to what extent the rule affected budgetary 
policy directly, but this can be proved later—following a government change the rules could contribute 
substantially to fiscal discipline. Thus, the two functions of the rule complement one another. The 
government that introduces the rule is usually already committed to disciplined policy and wishes to signal 
this with the new rule, but with the appearance of the new government, the rule changes its function 
according to our findings, and promotes disciplined management efficiently. This therefore means that 
fiscal rules are able to strengthen fiscal discipline not necessarily in the short term, but in the mid- and long 
term instead, which is also supported by the fact that the older the rule is, the higher the reputation cost its 
violation or modification implies.  
  
                                                     
18 The interaction coefficient was 0.96 and proved to be significant. Detailed results are shown in Attachment 3.  
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1. ATTACHMENT 
 
 
  
 
2. ATTACHMENT 
Results of the regression equation (8), using GAP2 instead of GAP3. The GAP2 binary variable assumes a 
value of 1 if the output gap is positive, and 0 otherwise. 
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3. ATTACHMENT 
The following regression table contains the results of equation (8) with the difference that the primary-
balance-to-GDP ratio was changed on both sides of the equation to cyclically adjusted primary-balance-to-
GDP. 
 
 
Explanatory variables
0,16 **
(0,02)
-0,65
(0,26)
0,95 ***
(0,00)
0,44 **
(0,05)
1,83
(0,11)
0,03
(0,23)
0,11
(0,19)
-0,02
(0,95)
0,27
(0,79)
N 123
R2 0,34
Output gap (GAP2)
Dependent variable: pb
Primary balance (pb[-1])
Fiscal Rules Index (FRI)
FRI*GAP2
*** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. p probability values are in brackets. 
The Arellano-Bond estimate was carried out with clustered standard errors by country and time fixed effect.
Government efficiency (WGI)
Debt rate (d-[1])
Electoral cycle (ELCT)
Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
Introduction of euro (EURO)
Explanatory variables
0,25 ***
(0,00)
-1,03
(0,15)
0,96 ***
(0,01)
-0,36
(0,17)
-0,98
(0,35)
0,03
(0,26)
0,14
(0,13)
0,02
(0,95)
1,26
(0,28)
N 123
Dependent variable: capb
Cyclically adjusted primary balance (capb[-1])
Fiscal Rules Index (FRI)
FRI*GAP3
Output gap (GAP3)
Government efficiency (WGI)
Debt rate (d-[1])
Electoral cycle (ELCT)
Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
Introduction of euro (EURO)
*** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. p probability values are in brackets. 
The Arellano-Bond estimate was carried out with clustered standard errors by country and time fixed effect.
